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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
William Morales appeals the decision of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Brody, Judge) approving and adopting the Report and 
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate (Scuderi, 
M.J.) affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's 
conclusion that Morales is not entitled to Disability 
Insurance Benefits (DIB) or Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) under Titles II and IV of the Social Security Act, 
42 U.S.C. SS 401-433, 1381-1383f. Because the 
Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence, we reverse the district court. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
I. Procedural History. 
 
Morales filed applications for DIB and SSI on July 31, 
1990, claiming disability starting August 15, 1989. His 
application was initially denied on September 12, 1990, 
and denied again on April 27, 1993, upon reconsideration 
by the agency responsible for disability determinations. 
More than two and a half years later, on May 12, 1993, the 
Appeals Council denied Morales's application. Thereafter, 
Morales, now represented by counsel, filed a request for an 
administrative hearing which took place approximately a 
year later on June 15, 1994. The Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) denied Morales's application based on Morales's work 
activity between May and September 1991 which the ALJ 
determined disqualified Morales from DIB entitlement. The 
Appeals Council denied Morales's request for review of the 
ALJ's decision. Morales filed a civil action in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. The Commissioner conceded the inadequacy 
of his prior administrative evaluation and on September 28, 
1995, the district court remanded the case for further 
evaluation. 
 
A supplemental administrative hearing was held on April 
9, 1997. On May 13, 1997, a second ALJ denied Morales's 
application, finding that Morales was not disabled because 
he could perform his past relevant work at all times after 
his alleged disability onset date. The Appeals Council 
denied Morales's appeal. Morales filed a second civil action 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. A United States Magistrate Report and 
Recommendation issued on August 16, 1999, endorsing the 
Commissioner's denial of benefits, was adopted, without 
opinion, by the district court on September 23, 1999. This 
appeal followed. 
 
II. Facts. 
 
Morales was born on December 1, 1960, and his life has 
been marked by mental health problems and drug and 
alcohol abuse. At the age of eight, Morales began to abuse 
alcohol accompanied by marijuana, L.S.D., Valium, and 
other drugs. Morales testified at the hearing that he had 
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completed a seventh-grade education, but had repeated the 
grade three times.1 Morales last worked as a landscaper for 
four months in 1991, when he earned $3462. Morales's 
other past relevant work includes jobs as a laborer and a 
packing line worker. 
 
On August 19, 1987, when Morales was twenty-six-years 
old, he was diagnosed with a Dependent Personality Disorder2 
and polysubstance dependence. Psychotherapy records 
completed by Morales's treating psychiatrist, Roger Erro, 
M.D., indicate that Morales is depressed, thinks often of 
killing himself, and gets violently angry. 
 
There is evidence in the record of Morales's drug and 
alcohol dependence. On October 10, 1990, Morales received 
treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. At the administrative 
hearing, he testified that he drank a lot and once in a while 
used cocaine. His attorney conceded that Morales has a 
continuing major drug and alcohol problem. 
 
Morales was incarcerated from 1989 to 1990 after a 
conviction for threatening a police officer. While in prison, 
he attempted suicide by cutting both his wrists. William 
Clovis, M.D., of Hahnemann University Correctional Mental 
Health Services Program consequently examined Morales 
and described him as depressed with suicidal plans, poor 
insight, and poor judgment. He diagnosed Morales with 
psychoneurotic depression, treated him with Xanax, 
Halcion, and later with Valium, and labeled his prognosis 
as fair. 
 
After Morales applied for disability benefits, he was 
examined by a slew of psychologists and psychiatrists. He 
was first referred to Luis Bird, M.D., from the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Disability Determination, who, after examining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At other places in the record, Morales stated that he had completed a 
fifth-grade education and an eighth-grade education. 
 
2. "A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and 
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's 
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early 
adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment." 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 629 (4th ed., 
Amer. Psych. Assn. 1994). 
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Morales filed a report on August 30, 1990. During the 
examination, Morales stated that since he had been out of 
jail, he could not sleep and had "crazy ideas about hurting 
himself." He also said that he had heard voices and had 
other hallucinations when he was in jail in January 1990. 
Dr. Bird noted Morales's mood was depressed and anxious. 
He also noted Morales had a difficult time with the cognitive 
part of the examination and that his general fund of 
knowledge was quite poor. He concluded that Morales has 
"an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features" 
and an impaired ability to concentrate, perform activities 
within a schedule, make decisions, be aware of normal 
hazards, and function when under stress or change. 
 
On April 13, 1993, Morales underwent a second 
psychiatric evaluation for the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Disability Determination with Richard Jaffe, M.D. During 
this interview, Morales's sister acted as an interpreter. Dr. 
Jaffe's report indicates that Morales was treated weekly at 
a mental health center for the three years prior to the 
evaluation and took Xanax three times a day. Dr. Jaffe 
documented Morales's poor grooming and hygiene and 
reported that Morales's ability to get along with others 
appeared "markedly impaired." Relevant to Morales's ability 
to work, Dr. Jaffe opined that Morales appeared to be 
markedly irresponsible with a history of multiplefirings due 
to poor performance on the job and poor interactions with 
others. He also reported that Morales's ability to attend to 
a task from beginning to end, to sustain a routine, to 
perform at a certain pace, to make decisions, to react to 
deadlines and schedules, and to maintain regular 
attendance is poor. Finally, he opined that Morales is likely 
to become physically abusive and threatening to others in 
conflict situations. 
 
Dr. Jaffe also suggested that he suspected Morales was 
malingering3 during the examination. He reported that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Malingering" is a medical term defined as the willful, deliberate, and 
fraudulent feigning or exaggeration of the symptoms of illness or injury. 
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 982 (2d ed. 1994). The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders notes that 
individuals who suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder may 
"repeatedly lie . . . con others, or malinger." Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 646 (4th ed., Amer. Psych. Assn. 1994). 
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       [o]n attempting to test his sensorium, he was extremely 
       uncooperative and appeared to be malingering on many 
       responses. In comparing the current examination with 
       that done by Dr. Bird, who was able to interview him 
       in Spanish, it would appear that he was not making 
       any efforts to answer questions correctly. He gave the 
       incorrect day of the week and incorrectly said he was 
       in Michigan, when asked where he was. He also 
       reported being unable to remember his own birth date, 
       which he was able to do with Dr. Bird before. He, 
       likewise, was unable to recall three repeated items after 
       several minutes, but the three answers he gave instead 
       were similar to those asked. For example, he 
       spontaneously remembered orange instead of red, and 
       remembered chair instead of table. This suggested that 
       he knew, in fact the correct responses and was 
       deliberately giving incorrect answers. 
 
Dr. Jaffe noted that evaluating Morales's cognitive ability 
was not possible "due to what appeared to be deliberate 
falsifying of responses on the part of the applicant." Despite 
notes that Morales was malingering, Dr. Jaffe diagnosed 
Morales with a personality disorder with both explosive and 
anti-social features. Dr. Jaffe's diagnosis is consistent with 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
which states that malingering is a symptom of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, 646 (4th ed., Amer. Psych. Assn. 
1994). He indicated that Morales's prognosis was"probably 
poor for any significant change over the next year, even 
with on-going counseling at the APM Mental Health 
Center." 
 
Morales was next sent for cognitive testing to be 
evaluated by psychologist Marged Lindner, Ph. D., with his 
sister acting as interpreter. The resultant reportfiled on 
April 19, 1993, indicates that Morales's IQ score is 51 with 
a verbal score of 52 and a performance score of 55. These 
scores are in the range of mild mental retardation. See 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 46 
(4th ed., Amer. Psych. Assn. 1994). Dr. Lindner reported 
that Morales's "ability to perform work-related activities 
appears to be limited. He could understand, retain and 
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follow certain kinds of instructions and perform simple 
repetitive tasks. His ability to relate to people is poor and 
his ability to tolerate pressure is poor." Like Dr. Jaffe, Dr. 
Lindner reported her doubt that Morales fully cooperated 
with the testing. However, she gave credit to her measure of 
Morales's IQ score. 
 
Two reports assessing Morales's ability to perform work- 
related tasks are also in the record. A Mental Residual 
Functional Capacity Assessment form was completed on 
September 10, 1990, by a non-examining state agency 
psychologist, Joseph Barrett, Ph. D. After reviewing 
Morales's medical record which, at this point in time, did 
not include Dr. Lindner's or Dr. Jaffe's reports, Dr. Barrett, 
a vocational psychologist, opined that Morales is"not 
significantly limited" in the ability to perform the following 
work-related activities: remember locations and work-like 
procedures, understand and remember simple instructions, 
ask simple questions or request assistance, maintain 
socially appropriate behavior, take normal precautions, and 
use public transportation. Dr. Barrett also opined that 
Morales is only "moderately limited"4 in his ability to 
perform the following: understand and remember detailed 
instructions, carry out simple instructions, maintain 
attention and concentration for extended periods, perform 
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, 
and be punctual, sustain an ordinary routine without 
special supervision, work in coordination with or in 
proximity to others without being distracted, make simple, 
work-related decision, complete a normal work week or 
work day without interruption from psychologically based 
symptoms, interact with the general public, accept 
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 
supervisors, get along with coworkers or peers, respond 
appropriately to changes in the work setting, and set 
realistic goals or make plans independently of others. 
Finally, Dr. Barrett reported that Morales's ability to carry 
out detailed instructions was "markedly limited." On April 
21, 1993, Edward C. Brennan, M.D., a second physician 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At the administrative hearing, the vocational expert, who relied on Dr. 
Barrett's report to testify, defined "moderately limited" to mean the 
claimant is unable to perform the task up to a third of the time. 
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who did not personally examine Morales, summarily 
affirmed Dr. Barrett's report. 
 
Dr. Erro, Morales's treating psychiatric physician since 
November 1991, also prepared a Mental Residual 
Functional Capacity Assessment. He completed his 
evaluation on September 16, 1993. Contrary to Dr. 
Barrett's report, Dr. Erro reported that Morales's ability to 
follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public, 
use judgment, interact with a supervisor, function 
independently, and maintain attention or concentration was 
"seriously limited."5 In addition, his ability to deal with 
work stresses, behave in an emotionally stable manner, 
relate predictably in social situations, and demonstrate 
reliability is rated by Dr. Erro as "poor or none."6 The 
treatment records attached to the evaluation indicate that 
Morales is stressed, anxious, manipulative, demanding, and 
is treated with various psychotropic drugs. The records also 
show that Morales does well on Xanax and that through 
August 1993, his anxiety was under adequate control with 
medication. 
 
Morales testified at both of his hearings and told the ALJ 
that he did not speak a lot of English. Morales testified that 
he had seen a psychiatrist two times a month since he was 
released from jail. He testified that he does not"have the 
mind for a job" and that he was fired from the landscaping 
job in 1991 because of problems with drugs, fighting, and 
absenteeism. He testified that he was fired from every job 
he ever had because of fighting. Morales also testified that 
he heard voices that made him very angry and want to hit 
things. 
 
The ALJ concluded that Morales has a severe adjustment 
disorder impairment in addition to a drug and alcohol 
addiction. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Morales's 
return to work in 1991 was substantial gainful activity 
rather than an unsuccessful work attempt, stating that "I 
am convinced that lack of motivation and social immaturity 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "Seriously limited" is defined as the"ability to function in this area 
is 
seriously limited but not precluded." 
 
6. "Poor to none" is defined as having"no useful ability in this area." 
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were the causes of leaving his last two jobs." The ALJ 
rejected the reports of Dr. Erro and Dr. Jaffe and Dr. 
Lindner's IQ scores, reasoning that the results reached by 
these physicians were because Morales was "manipulative, 
unmotivated, and possibly malingering" and that the IQ 
scores "do not comport with claimant appearance and 
demeanor or with the evidence in the record." The ALJ also 
rejected Morales's testimony, finding that Morales was not 
credible. The ALJ's decision indicates that the ALJ was 
influenced by his impression of Morales as immature, 
manipulative, and unmotivated. Based on the vocational 
expert's testimony at the administrative hearing that a 
hypothetical individual with Morales's age, education, work 
experience, and the limitations described in the Mental 
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment completed by Dr. 
Barrett, could perform the jobs of laborer, landscaper, farm 
laborer, and packing line worker, the ALJ found that 
Morales could perform any of his past jobs. Accordingly, the 
ALJ concluded that Morales was not disabled and denied 
his applications for DIB and SSI. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In order to establish eligibility for social security DIB and 
SSI, a claimant has the burden of demonstrating that he or 
she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity 
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 
S 423(d)(1)(A) (2000 Cum. Annual Pocket Part); 20 C.F.R. 
S 416.905(a) (1999). 
 
To determine whether a claimant is entitled to disability 
benefits, the Commissioner applies a sequentialfive-step 
inquiry pursuant to 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520. 
 
       [T]he [Commissioner] determines first whether an 
       individual is currently engaged in substantial gainful 
       activity. If that individual is engaged in substantial 
       gainful activity, he [or she] will be found not disabled 
       regardless of the medical findings. If an individual is 
       found not to be engaged in substantial gainful activity, 
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       the [Commissioner] will determine whether the medical 
       evidence indicates that the claimant suffers from a 
       severe impairment. If the [Commissioner] determines 
       that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment, the 
       [Commissioner] will next determine whether the 
       impairment meets or equals a list of impairments in 
       Appendix I of sub-part P of Regulations No. 4 of the 
       Code of Regulations. If the individual meets or equals 
       the list of impairments, the claimant will be found 
       disabled. If he [or she] does not, the [Commissioner] 
       must determine if the individual is capable of 
       performing his [or her] past relevant work considering 
       his [or her] severe impairment. If the [Commissioner] 
       determines that the individual is not capable of 
       performing his [or her] past relevant work, then he 
       must determine whether, considering the claimant's 
       age, education, past work experience and residual 
       functional capacity, he [or she] is capable of performing 
       other work which exists in the national economy. 
 
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583-84 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(internal citations omitted).7 The claimant bears the burden 
of establishing that he or she is incapable of performing his 
or her past relevant work due to a physical or mental 
impairment. See Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d 
Cir. 1983). In this case, the ALJ concluded that Morales 
retained the ability to perform his past relevant work as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The regulations dealing specifically with mental impairments further 
require the Commissioner to record the pertinent symptoms and effect of 
treatment to determine if an impairment exists. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1520a(b)(1) (1999). If an impairment is found, the Commissioner 
must analyze whether certain medical findings relevant to the claimant's 
ability to work are present or absent. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520a(b)(2). 
The Commissioner must then rate the degree of functional loss in certain 
areas deemed for work including daily living, social functioning, 
concentration, persistence or pace, and deterioration in work-like 
settings. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520a(b)(3). If the mental impairment is 
considered "severe," the Commissioner must determine if it meets a 
listed mental disorder. If it is severe but does not equal a listed 
disorder, 
the Commissioner must conduct a residual functional capacity 
assessment. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520a(c)(3). At each level of 
administrative adjudication, a Psychiatric Review Treatment Form must 
be completed. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520a(d). 
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landscaper and consequently was not disabled under the 
statute. 
 
Our review of the Commissioner's final decision denying 
Morales disability benefits is not plenary. We are bound to 
the Commissioner's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g) 
(2000 Cum. Annual Pocket Part); Plummer v. Apfel , 186 
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999); Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 
127-28 (3d Cir. 1997); Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 68 
(3d Cir. 1984). "Substantial evidence" is defined as "more 
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Plummer, 186 F.3d. at 422 (citing Ventura v. 
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir, 1995) (quoting 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal 
citation omitted))). As this Court has stated previously, 
 
       our decisions make clear that determination of the 
       existence vel non of substantial evidence is not merely 
       a quantitative exercise. A single piece of evidence will 
       not satisfy the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] 
       ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by 
       counterveiling evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it 
       is overwhelmed by other evidence -- particularly 
       certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating 
       physicians) -- or if it really constitutes not evidence 
       but mere conclusion. 
 
Kent, 710 F.2d at 114; Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 
183 (3d Cir. 1986). Despite the deference due to 
administrative decisions in disability benefit cases, 
"appellate courts retain a responsibility to scrutinize the 
entire record and to reverse or remand if the 
[Commissioner]'s decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence." Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
 
The Commissioner argues that its finding that Morales 
could return to his past relevant work is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and must be affirmed. 
Our review of the record, however, convinces us that the 
ALJ erred in applying the relevant legal standards to the 
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facts of this case. In particular, the ALJ improperly 
supplanted the opinions of Morales's treating and 
examining physicians with his personal observation and 
speculation. His subsequent reliance on the testimony of a 
vocational expert that did not consider this evidence, 
therefore, does not meet the substantiality test. 
 
The ALJ rejected Dr. Erro's opinion that Morales was 
"seriously limited" in his ability to perform work-related 
tasks and accepted instead the opinion of non-examining 
physician Dr. Barrett as reaffirmed by Dr. Brennan. Dr. 
Erro, who had treated Morales from January 1991 through 
September 1993, concluded that Morales's ability to follow 
work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public, use 
proper judgment, interact with a supervisor, function 
independently, and maintain attention or concentration was 
"seriously limited." He also concluded that Morales's ability 
to deal with work stress, behave in an emotionally stable 
manner, relate predictably in social situations, and 
demonstrate reliability was "poor to none." The ALJ rejected 
Dr. Erro's evaluation based on his personal observations of 
Morales at the administrative hearing, the evidence in the 
record of malingering, and notations in Dr. Erro's treatment 
notes that Morales was stable and well controlled with 
medication. 
 
A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility 
determinations is that the ALJ accord treating physicians' 
reports great weight, especially "when their opinions reflect 
expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the 
patient's condition over a prolonged period of time." 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 826 
F.2d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also Adorno v. Shalala, 
40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1994); Jones, 954 F.2d at 128; Allen 
v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1989); Frankenfield 
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988); Brewster, 786 
F.2d at 585. Where, as here, the opinion of a treating 
physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non- 
examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit 
but "cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong 
reason." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (citing Mason v. Shalala, 
994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). The ALJ must 
consider the medical findings that support a treating 
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physician's opinion that the claimant is disabled. See 
Adorno, 40 F.3d at 48. In choosing to reject the treating 
physician's assessment, an ALJ may not make "speculative 
inferences from medical reports" and may reject"a treating 
physician's opinion outright only on the basis of 
contradictory medical evidence" and not due to his or her 
own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion. 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429; Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 
405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988); Kent, 710 F.2d at 115. 
 
The ALJ's refusal to credit Dr. Erro's opinion was not 
based on objective medical evidence. The ALJ rejected Dr. 
Erro's opinion simply because he did not believe Morales's 
testimony at the hearing and because Dr. Jaffe and Dr. 
Lindner noted that Morales appeared to be malingering in 
their examinations of him. Although an ALJ may consider 
his own observations of the claimant and this Court cannot 
second-guess the ALJ's credibility judgments, they alone do 
not carry the day and override the medical opinion of a 
treating physician that is supported by the record. Dr. Erro, 
who had treated Morales for three years, concluded that 
Morales was markedly limited in a number of work-related 
activities. This opinion is supported by the conclusions 
reached by Dr. Jaffe and Dr. Lindner. The ALJ cannot, as 
he did here, disregard this medical opinion based solely on 
his own "amorphous impressions, gleaned from the record 
and from his evaluation of [the claimant]'s credibility." Kent, 
710 F.2d at 115. 
 
Dr. Jaffe's and Dr. Lindner's mentions of malingering also 
do not justify rejecting outright Dr. Erro's opinion. Despite 
Dr. Jaffe's and Dr. Lindner's observations of possible 
malingering on the part of Morales, Dr. Jaffe ultimately 
concluded that Morales suffered from a "personality 
disorder with explosive and anti-social features" and Dr. 
Lindner gave Morales an IQ score of 51, a range that 
classifies him as at least mildly mentally retarded. Dr. Jaffe 
specifically determined that Morales's ability to attend to a 
job from beginning to end, to sustain a routine, perform at 
a certain pace, make decisions, react to deadlines and 
schedules, and maintain proper attendance is "poor." The 
ALJ ignored the ultimate conclusions and medical 
symptomatology in these reports that lend support to Dr. 
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Erro's opinion and chose instead to draw his own medical 
conclusion based solely on a credibility determination and 
the pieces of the examination reports that supported this 
determination. The Commissioner cannot reject Dr. Erro's 
medical opinion simply by having the ALJ make a different 
medical judgment. Here, the objective medical conclusions 
of Dr. Jaffe and Dr. Lindner support, rather than 
contradict, Dr. Erro's assessment. Because the ALJ's 
rejection of Dr. Erro's opinion based on the scant evidence 
of malingering is a function of lay speculation that is 
overwhelmed by counterveiling medical expert evidence, the 
ALJ did not give proper weight to Dr. Erro's opinion. 
 
The ALJ also erred by ignoring Dr. Jaffe's conclusions 
about Morales's work ability and the IQ scores reported by 
Dr. Lindner. The only reason provided for the ALJ's 
rejection of Dr. Jaffe's opinion is his conclusion that these 
results are unreliable because Morales is manipulative. As 
we have explained, this credibility determination is not 
objective medical evidence and not an acceptable basis 
standing alone for rejecting an examining physician's 
conclusion. For the same reason, the ALJ incorrectly 
refused to consider Morales's IQ score. The ALJ reasoned 
that the "IQ scores do not comport with claimant 
appearance and demeanor or with the evidence in the 
record" and reasoned that Morales had lied about his 
education, could follow the plots of daytime television 
shows, and "that a person with an IQ in the 50s could not 
function in a normal work environment as claimant was 
able to do so when it suited him." An ALJ cannot reject IQ 
scores based on personal observations of the claimant and 
speculative inferences drawn from the record. Certainly, no 
doctor in the record made any statement which would 
support the ALJ's speculation that "[a] person with an IQ in 
the 50s could not function in a normal work environment 
as claimant was able to do when it suited him." Because 
Dr. Jaffe's conclusions and the IQ scores were not 
discredited based on objective medical evidence, they 
should have been fully considered in assessing Morales's 
ability to perform his past work. 
 
Nor was it proper for the ALJ to reject Dr. Erro's opinion 
based on Dr. Erro's notation that Morales was stable with 
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medication. The relevant inquiry with regard to a disability 
determination is whether the claimant's condition prevents 
him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 42 
U.S.C. S 423(d)(1)(A). For a person, such as Morales, who 
suffers from an affective or personality disorder marked by 
anxiety, the work environment is completely different from 
home or a mental health clinic. Dr. Erro's observations that 
Morales is "stable and well controlled with medication" 
during treatment does not support the medical conclusion 
that Morales can return to work. Dr. Erro, despite his 
notation, opined that Morales's mental impairment 
rendered him markedly limited in a number of relevant 
work-related activities. Other information in the treatment 
records supports this opinion. Thus, Dr. Erro's opinion that 
Morales's ability to function is seriously impaired or 
nonexistent in every area related to work shall not be 
supplanted by an inference gleaned from treatment records 
reporting on the claimant in an environment absent of the 
stresses that accompany the work setting. 
 
The principle that an ALJ should not substitute his lay 
opinion for the medical opinion of experts is especially 
profound in a case involving a mental disability. This Court 
has said before that an ALJ's personal observations of the 
claimant "carry little weight in cases . . . involving medically 
substantiated psychiatric disability." Daring , 727 F.2d at 
70. Conceivably, malingering and manipulation are 
symptoms of the anti-social personality disorder, from 
which, the record indicates, Morales suffers. See Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 646 (4th ed. 
Amer. Psych. Assn. 1994) ("individuals with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder . . . may repeatedly lie, use an alias, 
con others, or malinger."). Thus, these symptoms support, 
rather than contradict Dr. Erro's, Dr. Jaffe's, and Dr. 
Lindner's ultimate conclusions. Accordingly, the ALJ's 
conclusory rejection of Dr. Erro's opinion based on three 
years of treating Morales was improper. Dr. Erro's 
evaluation and opinion, the IQ scores, and Dr. Jaffe's 
conclusions should have been fully considered by the ALJ 
in evaluating whether Morales is capable of performing 
substantial gainful employment. 
 
To conclude that Morales could perform his past work, 
the ALJ also relied on the fact that Morales worked as a 
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landscaper for a total of four months in 1991. The ALJ 
hastily concluded that Morales terminated this employment 
on his own volition because of laziness. There is no 
evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion except his own 
speculative judgment. The employer's note in the record 
states only that Morales quit the job and does not provide 
any further explanation. The evidence in the record 
supports the conclusion that the symptoms of Morales's 
personality disorder made working with others impossible 
and Morales's effort at landscaping was an unsuccessful 
work attempt. It bears repeating that the question posed by 
a disability determination is whether the claimant can 
engage in substantial gainful activity. An attempt to work 
that ultimately fails because of the symptoms of the 
disability is not substantial gainful activity. Thus, the fact 
that Morales managed to work for four months does not, 
standing alone in contrast to significant evidence of 
disability, preclude a finding that Morales is disabled. 
 
The ALJ's conclusion that Morales can return to his past 
relevant work must be reversed. Shorn of its rhetoric, this 
determination rests solely on a rejection of medically- 
credited symptomatology and opinion, the ALJ's personal 
observations and speculation, and the testimony of a non- 
examining vocational expert who considered only a 
hypothetical based on Dr. Barrett's check-list report written 
in 1990, long before the record was complete, and only 
summarily approved in 1993. The Brennan/Barrett report 
indicates that Morales is only "moderately limited" in work- 
related activities. This classification was reached only by a 
review of the record and is contradicted by the opinions of 
Dr. Erro, Dr. Jaffe, and Dr. Lindner. Furthermore, the 
Brennan/Barrett check-list-style report was prepared 
without the benefit of an examination of Morales, Dr. Jaffe's 
report, Dr. Lindner's tests, and Dr. Erro's work-skills 
assessment. "[I]t is well established that the opinions of a 
doctor who has never examined a patient `have less 
probative force as a general matter, than they would have 
had if the doctor had treated or examined him.' " Brewster, 
786 F.2d at 585 (quoting Podedworny v. Harris , 745 F.2d 
210, 217 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted)). 
Furthermore, a single piece of evidence is not substantial if 
the Commissioner failed to resolve a conflict created by 
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counterveiling evidence or if it is overwhelmed by other 
evidence -- particularly that offered by a treating physician. 
See Gilliland, 786 F.2d at 183, Kent, 710 F.2d at 114. 
"Vocational expert testimony alone does not provide the 
necessary substantial evidence from which to deduce a 
capacity to engage in substantial gainful activity when 
there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary in the 
record." DeLeon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
734 F.2d 930, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1984). Because the ALJ did 
not give proper consideration to the opinions of Dr. Erro, 
Dr. Jaffe, and Dr. Lindner, all of which present 
counterveiling evidence to the Brennan/Barrett evaluation, 
the vocational expert testimony does not meet the 
substantiality test. 
 
The question remaining is whether this case should be 
remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative 
proceedings or reversed with direction to the District Court 
that benefits be awarded. This case, like many others 
involving disability determinations, has suffered 
considerable inexplicable delays, see Plummer , 186 F.3d at 
435, and we hesitate to add further abeyance. Morales has 
had two hearings before an ALJ followed by two petitions to 
the appeals council, two appeals to the district court, and 
the present appeal to the court of appeals. The disability 
determination has already taken ten years and the record 
is unlikely to change. Furthermore, the delay in this case 
has been caused by deficiencies that are not attributable to 
any error of the claimant. See Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 
223. Moreover, the extensive medical record, wrongly 
rejected by the ALJ, is substantial evidence that Morales 
suffers from a severe mental disability that renders him 
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. In 
Podedworny, this Court instructed that "[t]he decision to 
direct the district court to award benefits should be made 
only when the administrative record of the case has been 
fully developed and when substantial evidence in the record 
as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and 
entitled to benefits." Id. at 222. In our view, that test is met 
here. Because substantial evidence dictates a finding by the 
Commissioner that Morales is disabled and entitled to 
disability benefits, we reverse the judgment of the district 
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court and do not remand this case for further 
administrative proceedings. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment and remand 
this case to the district court with directions to award 
appellant the benefits to which he is entitled from August 
15, 1989. 
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